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MANAGED HEALTH CARE IN PRISONS AS
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
IRA P. ROBBINS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Billy Roberts, a prisoner in an Alabama state prison, had a
history of severe psychiatric disorders.! He was often put on sui-
cide watch, and received large doses of psychotropic drugs. A
managed health care company, Correctional Medical Services
(CMS), was responsible for the health care at the prison.3 After
Roberts had a suicidal episode, CMS's statewide mental health
care director reportedly put Roberts in an isolation cell rather
than a psychiatric care unit.4 The mental health care director
also ordered that Roberts' medication be discontinued pursuant
to an alleged policy of CMS to get as many prisoners off psycho-
tropic drugs as possible in order to keep costs down.5 Six days
later, Billy Roberts hanged himself.
6
This is not an isolated case. In an effort to cut costs or to
provide constitutionally adequate health care to inmates, an in-
creasing number of prisons have been using managed care sys-
* Barnard T. Welsh Scholar and Professor of Law and Justice, American Univer-
sity, Washington College of Law. A.B. 1970, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1973,
Harvard University. Author, HABEAS CORPUS CHECKISTS (West Group, 2000); Editor,
PRIsONERS AND THE LAW (four vols., West Group, 1999). I am grateful to Catherine
Ng, Benjamin Olson, Adrianne Turner, Sara Young, and Susan Zentay for their excel-
lent research assistance, and to the American University Law School Research Fund
for providing financial support.
' See McDuffie v. Hopper, 982 F. Supp. 817, 821 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
2 See id.
'See id. at 820-21.




tems to provide health care.7 Although the use of managed care
has saved states money, the quality of health care arguably has
decreased. Inadequate care has been a recurring problem in
prisons run by private managed health care firms. Conse-
quently, prisoners and staff continue to complain, and prisoners
are filing suits asserting that their constitutional rights have
been violated.8
Courts have evaluated claims of constitutional violations in
cases in which prisoners have challenged the adequacy of their
medical treatment under the "deliberate indifference" standard,
first announced by the Supreme Court in 1976, in Estelle v. Gam-
ble.9 In Estelle, the Supreme Court established that, when prison
officials are deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs
of prisoners, the prisoners' Eighth Amendment right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment has been violated.'0 In An-
cata v. Prison Health Services," for example, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that, "if neces-
sary medical treatment has been delayed for non-medical rea-
sons, a case of deliberate indifference has been made out.
12
Financial considerations constitute "non-medical reasons."'3
Thus, the use of managed care in prisons with the intent of cut-
ting costs may constitute an institutional deliberate indifference
on the part of the prisons.
7 See infra note 174 and accompanying text (discussing the role of cost-cutting in
prison health care contracting); DOUGLAS C. MCDONALD, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE, MANAGING PRISON H.ALTH CARE AND CoSTS 61-72 (1995) (discussing privatiza-
tion of health care by prisons in an attempt to comply with constitutional standards
for adequate care); see, e.g., Nobles v. Duncil, 505 S.E.2d 442, 446, 451 (W. Va. 1998)
(addressing privatization of health care services by a state prison in an effort to com-
ply with a court order to remedy inadequate level of health care).
8 See infra Part III.G (discussing suits brought by prisoners); Fifteen Tips for Contract-
ing Out Correctional Health Care, CORRECTIONS ALERT, Nov. 9, 1998, at 1 [hereinafter
Fifteen Tips] (reporting complaints by prison staff).
'429 U.S. 97 (1976).
"See infra Part IIIA (discussing Estelle and the history of the "deliberate indiffer-
ence" standard).
" 769 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Archer v. Dutcher, 733 F.2d 14 (2d Cir.
1984).
" 769 F.2d at 704.
13 See id.
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MANAGED HEALTH CARE IN PRISONS
This Article examines the use of managed care in prisons
and discusses some of the legal issues surrounding managed
care practices. The Article argues that the use of managed care
may result in an overemphasis on costs that in certain instances
rises to the level of deliberate indifference, thereby violating the
Eighth Amendment.
H. MANAGED HEALTH CARE IN PRISONS
The goal of managed health care is to have a health care
system that operates more cost-effectively than the traditional
fee-for-service system.1 4 In managed health care systems, how-
ever, this goal is often achieved through cost-cutting measures."
Thus, managed health care can result in inadequate treatment
for patients. Concerns regarding inadequate health care are
magnified in a prison setting, in which inmates have no choice
about health care and cannot seek outside advice. They are left
to the discretion of the health care provider chosen by the
county or state.' In addition, since prisoners themselves are not
usually paying customers, 7 health care providers have even less
of an incentive to provide quality care.
" See Sharon L. Davies & Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Managed Care: Placebo or Wonder
Drugfor Health Care Fraud and Abuse, 31 GA. L. REv. 373, 373 (1997) (stating that man-
aged care alters the incentive structure in health care provision).
' See id. at 385-87.
lb See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54-55 (1988) ("It is only those physicians author-
ized by the State to whom the inmate may turn."); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103
(1976) ("An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the
authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met."). Furthermore, prison officials
may have a conflict of interest because they must consider both financial and medical
issues. Thus, prison health care may be compromised. See, e.g., One-Third of Texas In-
mates May Have Hepatitis C, Offkials Say, DALAS MORNING NEWS, May 29, 1999, at 39A
(reporting that prison officials were undecided about whether to administer a costly
but effective drug to inmates).
17 Some prison health care schemes use co-payments in providing managed health
care. These systems require the inmate to pay a small fee for certain types of services.
See Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that co-payment stat-
utes as implemented are constitutional). Co-payment statutes have come under at-
tack, but have thus far been held constitutional as long as they require payment only
from inmates who have the resources to pay. See id. The plaintiffs in Reynolds chal-
lenged the co-payments under the deliberate indifference standard. See id. at 172.
They argued, first, that the co-payments were per se unconstitutional, and second, that
the co-payment system as implemented was unconstitutional. See id. The court held
that the co-payment scheme was not per se unconstitutional: "[i] f a prisoner is able to
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To understand how managed health care works in prisons,
it is first necessary to consider why counties or states would
choose managed health care for their prisons. While some of
the reasons are logistical, the primary concern is always finan-
cial.18
A. MANAGED CARE
There are three major components of a managed care sys-
tem: (1) the managed care organization (MCO), which acts as
an insurer and finances the health care of the members of its
health care plans;' 9 (2) the health care provider, which can be a
physician, a group of physicians, a hospital, or a physician-
hospital association;2° and (3) the health plan member or pa-
tient.
21
Managed health care evolved as a reaction by health care
consumers and the federal government to rapidly escalating
22
health care costs under the traditional fee-for-service system.
pay for medical care, requiring such payment is not 'deliberate indifference to seri-
ous medical needs."' Id. at 174 (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32
(1993)). The court also held that the co-payment scheme as implemented did not
rise to the level of deliberate indifference. See id. at 178-79; see also City of Revere v.
Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 245 n.7 (1983) ("Nothing we say here affects
any right a hospital or government entity may have to recover from a detainee the
cost of medical services provided to him.").
" As inmate populations and prison health care costs have continued to increase,
federal, state, and local governments have sought to cut costs by contracting with pri-
vate managed care organizations. See Chuck Appleby, Going Private to Capture Savings,
Hosps. & HEALTH NETWORxS, May 20, 1997, at 70; U.S. Medical Group Acquires American
Mobile Surgical Services, Inc., PR NEWSWRE, June 7, 1999, at *1.
" See LEmV SHI & DOUGLAS A. SINGH, DELVERING HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 303-06
(1998). In an attempt to cater to varying consumer demands, MCOs take on a wide
variety of forms. See infra note 25 (discussing the rationale behind different forms of
MCOs).
20 See Sm & SINGH, supra note 19, at 303-06.
21 See id.
"From 1962 to 1975, the Consumer Price Index reported that medical costs rose
59%, more than any other major category of personal expenses. See ROBERT G.
SHOULDICE, INTRODUCrIONTO MANAGED CARE 28 (1991). This dramatic increase ren-
dered the fee-for-service system, in which patients or their health insurance programs
paid health care providers a fee for each service performed, unworkable because the
patients or their employers could not continue to pay the escalating insurance pre-
miums. See id. at 17-29. Congress responded by passing the Health Maintenance Act
of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 300(e) (1994), which encouraged the expansion of MCOs
through federal assistance. See id. at 36. Since 1973, the number of MCOs has grown
MANAGED HEALTH CARE INPRISONS
The term "managed care" generally refers to a variety of admin-
istrative and treatment practices that attempt to improve the
quality, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness of the health care sys-
tem." Although virtually all forms of health insurance now in-
corporate managed care to some degree,24 for-profit MCOs are
at the forefront in the application of managed care practices.2
Because MCOs compete with one another to offer the lowest
monthly fees to consumers, they must control health care costs
through policies designed to reduce both the cost and the
amount of care provided.
Because MCOs contract with employers for a fixed per-
patient or per-incident fee, the MCO assumes the financial risk
27that costs will exceed that fixed amount. For this reason,
MCOs have a great incentive to minimize high-cost treatments,
particularly those that require hospitalization or the consulta-
tion of specialists.2 s Because many MCOs pass the risk along to
health care providers through fixed fees, doctors and other
health care professionals face similar incentives to provide less
treatment at a lower cost2 However, the risk that the provision
rapidly and, as of 1997, an estimated 85% of employees from firms with 10 or more
employees were covered by some form of managed care. See Craig Copeland, Issues of
Quality and Consumer Rights in the Health Care Market, EBRI IssuE BRiEF, Apr. 1998, at 1,
5.
" See Vicki Yates Brown & Barbara Reid, Managed Care at the Crossroads: Can Man-
aged Care Organizations Survive Government Regulation?, 7 ANNALS HELTH L. 25, 25-26
(1998).
24 See Marsha Gold, The Changing U.S. Health Care System, 77 MILBANK Q. 3, 8-9
(1999).
In response to demands for health care plans that provide a choice of providers
at a low cost, MCOs have taken on a range of forms and implemented a variety of
managed care policies in an attempt to attract the most health care plan enrollees.
See SHI & SINGH, supra note 19, at 313-21. For example, the two largest types of
MCOs-health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and preferred provider organiza-
tions (PPOs)-compete for consumers by striking different balances between pro-
vider choice and cost-containment. See id. HMOs generally maintain the lowest fees
by limiting enrollees to an approved group of providers. See id. At a higher fee, PPOs
allow enrollees to choose any provider, but encourage use of approved providers by
covering their treatment at a higher rate. See id.
216 See id. at 303-12.
2See id. at 303-04; Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Health System in Transition, 22J. HEALTH
POL'Y& L. 339, 342 (1997).
" See Davies &Jost, supra note 14, at 379-93.
2See id.
1999]
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of a low quality of care will cause the MCO to lose its contract
with the consumer, or the provider to lose its contract with the
MCO, acts as a counter-balance to incentives to cut costs to a
point at which the quality of care becomes unsatisfactory to con-
sumers.3' Nevertheless, there is a strong concern that, left to its
own devices, the market will not strike an acceptable balance
between cost and quality in the provision of health care.
One way that managed care controls costs is through a utili-
zation review strategy. 2 MCOs oversee the decisions made by
health care providers in order to ensure that the providers are
conforming to the standards set by the MCO.3 3 If the providers
do not conform to these standards, they can suffer financial
penalties. 4
While there may be some debate whether managed care
provides better or worse care for the patient,35 it is clear that
" See supra note 25 (describing the competition between MCOs to provide the
most service at the lowest cost); Walter A. Zelman, Consumer Protection in Managed
Care, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 158, 163-64 (discussing consumer choice of
managed care plans as a vehicle for consumer protection).
-1 See Zelman, supra note 30, at 158 (discussing consumer fears about health care
quality in managed care systems).
2 See SHI & SINGH, supra note 19, at 310-12.
3See id.
See id.
On the one hand, MCOs argue that reduced quantity does not mean reduced
quality:
Advocates of managed care challenge conventional wisdom when they claim that doing less
produces a greater outcome for the patient than taking action .... Managed care is a
unique form of health-care delivery because it is premised on the idea that often, in medi-
cal care, less is more. What produces value in managed care is a good health outcome
rather than medical intervention.
ARNOLD BIRENBAuM, MANAGED CARE: MADE IN AMERICA 13-14 (1997). On the other
hand, the effects of managed care on health care quality have not been proven one
way or the other:
One of the current realities of health policy making is that anecdotes far outweigh
solid evidence when it comes to shaping the attitudes of people in relation to the perform-
ance of managed care.... Quality-of-care evidence from fifteen studies showed an equal
number of significantly better and worse HMO results, compared with non-HMO plans.
However, in several instances, Medicare HMO enrollees with chronic conditions showed
worse quality of care.... Fears that HMOs uniformly lead to worse quality of care are not
supported by the evidence .... Hopes that HMOs would improve overall quality also are
not supported, in part because of slow clinical practice change, lack of risk-adjusted [fixed]
rates, and inadequate quality measurement and reporting.
Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Does Managed Care Lead to Better or Worse Quality of
Care?, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 7, 7-8. But see STATE AUDITOR OF TEXAS, AN
MANAGED HEALTH CARE 1N PRISONS
managed care provides less care to patients and prevents health
care providers from using additional treatments and unproven
medical intervention. 6 One of the positive aspects of managed
care is that the application of business principles can reduce
health care expenditures and thus allow a greater number of
individuals to receive health insurance by keeping premiums
low. 7 In addition, unnecessary treatments and unnecessary
hospitalization are sharply reduced.38 Managed care also en-
courages the use of preventive care, as patients are forced to
rely more on primary care physicians.
On the other hand, doctors make less money than they do
under the fee-for-service system. Moreover, as described
above, MCOs second-guess doctors' judgments, as doctors need
to get approval from MCOs for tests and surgical procedures.4
In this way, managed care can undermine the role played by
doctors in treatment decisions by compromising medical con-
siderations with financial concerns, thereby lowering the stan-
dard of care.
B. MANAGED HEALTH CARE IN PRISONS
Managed health care in prisons is conspicuously different
from managed health care on the outside. First, the general
prison population is usually less healthy than the general popu-
lation. Second, the quality of health care in prisons is usually
AUDIT REPORT ON MANAGED HEALTH CARE AT THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL
JusncE 49 (1998) [hereinafter TExAS AUDIT] (statement of David P. Smith, M.D.,
President of the Correctional Managed Health Care Advisory Committee: "Texas of-
fenders are being provided increased access to a higher quality health care at a lower
cost than by pre-managed care practices.").
See Miller & Luft, supra note 35, at 20-21.
'
7 See Sm & SINGH, supra note 19, at 308-13.
See id.
"See BIRENBAUM, supra note 35, at 86.
40 See id. at 156-57.
See Thaddeus J. Nodzenski, Regulating Managed Care Coverage, 7 ANNALS HEALTH
L. 1, 7 (1998).
42 See McDONALD, supra note 7, at 3; see, e.g., Laura Beil, Prisons Draft Treatment Plans
for Inmates With Hepatitis C; Almost 30% Have Infection; Care Will Cost State Millions,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 18, 1999, at 35A (reporting that in Texas prisons more
than 40,000 inmates, nearly one-third of prison population, are infected with Hepati-
tis C, a highly communicable and life-threatening liver disease).
1999]
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lower than the quality of health care provided to the portion of
the outside population covered by managed care. Third, the
patients in a prison setting have no choice regarding health
plans; they must take the plan provided for them." Fourth, if
the health care provider in the prison refuses to provide treat-
ment, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the prisoner to get
treatment elsewhere.45
In its structure, however, prison managed care is the same
as general managed care. MCOs hire health care providers and
supervise their provision of health care the same way in prisons
as they do in general managed care. Ultimately, the focus is
on efficiency and cutting costs, since the primary goal of MCOs
is enhancing the financial bottom line.47 This goal often results
41 See generally MCDONALD, supra note 7; Michael Cameron Friedman, Special Proj-
ect, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the Provision of Pison Medical Care: Challenging The
Deliberate Indifference Standard, 45 VAND. L. REv. 921, 932 (1992).
"SeeEstelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
See id Also, a prisoner's inability to seek treatment elsewhere could become
problematic if an MCO provides hospice care in addition to curative care. Because
hospice or non-curative care is significantly less expensive than curative care, an MCO
may have a conflict of interest in determining whether to abandon curative care for
the prisoner. See NAT'L INST. OF CORRECTIONS INFORMATION CENTER, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, HOSPICE AND PALLIATIVE CARE IN PRISONS 2 (1998) (stating that hospice care is
less expensive than traditional treatment). This issue is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle, however. For information regarding hospice care and other alternatives, see,
e.g., 2 PRISONERS AND THE LAW ch. 14B (Ira P. Robbins ed., 1999) ("Compassionate
Release"); Ronald H. Aday, Golden Years Behind Bars: Special Programs and Facilities for
Elderly Inmates, 58 FED. PROBATION 47 (June 1994); William B. Aldenberg, Note, Burst-
ing at the Seams: An Analysis of Compassionate Release Statutes and the Current Problem of
HIV and AIDS in U.S. Prisons and Jails, 24 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
541 (1998); Nancy Neveloff Dubler, The Collision of Confinement and Care: End-ofLife
Care in Prisons and Jails, 26J.L. MED. & ETHICS 149, 149-56 (1998); Marjorie P. Russell,
Too Little, Too Late, Too Slow: Compassionate Release of Terminally Ill Prisoners-Is the Cure
Worse Than the Disease?, 3 WIDENERJ. PUB. L. 799 (1994); Susan Lundstrom, Comment,
Dying to Get Out: A Study on the Necessity, Importance, and Effectiveness of Prison Early Re-
lease Programs for Elderly Inmates Suffering From HIV Disease and Other Terminal-Centered
Illnesses, 9 BYUJ. PUB. L. 155 (1994). See also Laurie Smith Anderson, Inmates Helping
Inmates; Louisiana State Penitentiary's Hospice Program Receives National Recognition,
BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Apr. 17, 1998, at 1; Jeff Barnard, Killers Provide Comfort to Dying
Inmates in Oregon; Hospice Program Brings Solace to the Ailing, Humanity to the Caregivers,
TACOMANEWS TRIB.,July 18, 1999, at 1.
46 See MCDoNALD, supra note 7, at 61-66.
'7 See supra Part IIA (discussing the motivations of MCOs).
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in treatment decisions that are based less on the inmates' needs
and more on saving money.48
1. The Different Companies
To date, there are fourteen private sector firms that provide
inmate health care.49 Approximately twenty-nine states have
50managed care in all or part of their prison health care systems.
The two main companies that provide correctional managed
health care are American Service Group, Inc. (ASG)5' and
CMS.52  CMS has contracts that provide care "to more than
268,600 inmates at 348 correctional facilities in 30 states. '3
ASG, the parent company of Prison Health Services, Inc. (PHS)
and EMSA Correctional Care, Inc. (EMSA), 4 manages health
care for more than "134,000 inmates in 25 states. '5  Prior to
ASG's acquisition of EMSA in 1999, EMSA claimed to "cover"
71,000 inmates in 19 states.56 PHS has been providing health
care in prisons since 1978, and claims to be "the founder of the
managed correctional healthcare industry."
57
See TExAs AuDrr, supra note 35, at 49.
"See Fifteen Tips, supra note 8, at 1.
50 See id.
"' ASG's website can be found at <http://www.asgr.com> [hereinafter AGS web-
site].
' GMS's website can be found at <http://www.cmsstl.com> [hereinafter CMS
Website].
5 CMS Website, supra note 52, at <http://www.cmsstl.com/about.html>.
14 PHS's website can be found at <http://www.prisonhealth.com> [hereinafter
PHS Website]. EMSA's website can be found at <http://www.corrections.com/emsa>
[hereinafter EMSA Website].
" ASG Website, supra note 51, <http://www.asgr.com/phs.htm>. For commentary
on ASG's purchase of EMSA, see Rick Rousos, Inmate Care Provider Bought; A Parent
Company Regains Jail Health Services in Polk Through Buyout, LAKELAND LEDGER, Feb. 10,
1999, at Al; America Service Group Announces First Quarter Gains, CORREIONS PROF.,
May 21, 1999, at 19.
' See EMSA Website, supra note 54. In several instances, EMSA was fired due to in-
adequate provision of health care. Westchester County, in New York, terminated its
contract with EMSA after the suicide of a teenage girl under its care. See Health Care
Firm Dropped, N.Y. DAILYNEWS, Dec. 14,1998, at 1. In 1996 and 1997, Polk and Pinel-
las Counties in Florida terminated their contracts with EMSA because of inadequate
care. See Down the Same Path?, LAKELAND LEDGER, Aug. 31, 1996, at A8.
" PHS Website, supra note 54, <http://www.prisonhealth.com/toppagel.htm>.
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2. Contracts for Services
Prisons may contract out a variety of health services. For
example, the contract for Texas Correctional Managed Health
Care demonstrates the typical arrangement in a prison man-
aged care system. 8 In this contract, Texas state universities pro-
vide complete medical services to the prisons.59 The contract
contains a fee-per-offender provision that limits the amount the
health care provider must spend on each inmate.w The fee-per-
offender varies with respect to "the services provided and the
differences in demographics and health status of the inmates.'
Other forms of service contracts are more limited and provide
only specific off-site services, such as dental care or psychologi-
cal care.62
3. Accreditation Standards
There are some non-governmental means of ensuring the
quality of care provided by a correctional managed care entity.
One such means is accreditation. Accreditation of prison man-
aged care systems is governed by the National Commission on
Correctional Health Care (NCCHC). Accreditation is by no
means mandatory; it merely provides companies with a seal ofS 63
approval to. help them attract business. NCCHC encourages
38 See Abstract, Texas Correctional Managed Health Care (visited Nov. 9, 1999)
<http://www.lcc.net/-cmhc/bestprac.txt>. The Texas System, however, has an addi-
tional component that is not typical of prison managed care systems: a legislatively
mandated Correctional Managed Health Care Advisory Committee (Committee) that
oversees the entire system. See TExAs AUDIT, supra note 35, at 6. The Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice (Department) contracts with the Committee, which con-
tracts with the universities for correctional health care state-wide. See id. at 6-7. The
six-member Committee includes two members from the Department and two from
each of the universities. See id. A recent report by the Texas State Auditor criticized
the multi-layered system. See id. at 7-8. The audit reported that the objectivity of the
health care procurement could be compromised because two-thirds of the Commit-
tee members are employees of the universities providing health care. See id. In addi-
tion, the multi-layered contracting tends to obscure which parties are responsible for
which aspects of the system. See id. at 11-12.
"' SeeTFXASAUDIr, supra note 35, at 11-12.
6See id.
61 Id.
12 See McDoNALD, supra note 7, at 62.
" See National Commission on Correctional Health Care Health Services Accredi-
tation (visited Nov. 9, 1999) <http://www.corrections.com/ncchc/accreditation.html>
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correctional facilities to have their health care provision systems
accredited whether they are operated by the state or by a private
MCO.6
The process for receiving NCCHC accreditation is not strin-
gent. It consists of completing a Self-Survey Questionnaire and
having an accreditation site visit.0 The NCCHC assures pro-
spective accreditees that the site visit will be "scheduled only
when you feel you are ready."6 The NCCHC examines the fol-
lowing areas: "facility governance and administration, managing
a safe and healthy environment, personnel and training, health
care services support, inmate care and treatment, health promo-
tion and disease prevention, special [inmates'] needs and serv-
ices, health records, and medical legal issues., 67  Thus, the
accreditation provides for external peer review to ensure that
correctional health care systems meet certain standards for the
provision of health services.ts
NCCHC accreditation may be beneficial to the companies,
but it ensures only a basic level of care in prisons.6 9 However,
judicial standards on health care in prisons impose more rigor-
ous requirements on MCOs. The United States Supreme Court,
through a series of cases, has specified "deliberate indifference"
as the threshold for prison health care.70 MCOs that are delib-
erately indifferent to prisoners' serious medical needs will be
held to have violated the Eighth Amendment.
[hereinafter NCCHC Website]. According to the NCCHC, the benefits of this op-
tional accreditation are adding prestige to facilities, improving employee morale, aid-
ing recruiting efforts, obtaining increased budgets, and improving community
support. See id. NCCHC also states that accreditation can reduce "liability premiums






"See William Allen & Kim Bell, Watchdog Without Teeth, ST. Louis PoST-DISPATCH,
Sept. 27, 1998, at G3 (stating that NCCHC accreditation only ensures a basic level of
care and is not the "watchdog" organization that it is perceived to be). On the debate
concerning the merits of prison accreditation generally, see 3 PRISONERS AND THE LAW
ch. 18 (Ira P. Robbins ed., 1999).
70 See infra Part IIIA (discussing the deliberate indifference standard).
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III. THE "DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE" STANDARD
A. HISTORY OF THE STANDARD
In 1976, the Supreme Court established the "deliberate in-
difference" standard for Eighth Amendment claims of unconsti-
tutional prison health care in Estelle v. Gamble.71 In Estelle, the
respondent, J.W. Gamble, was injured while performing a
prison work project.72 He complained that the treatment he re-
ceived after the injury was inadequate and filed a civil rights ac-
tion under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 73 One month after Gamble
received his injury, the treating doctor certified him as capable
of light work.74 Over the next two months, Gamble was brought
before the prison disciplinary committee for failure to work,
even though he continued to complain about back and chest
pains.75 On a constitutional challenge to the health care that
had been provided to Gamble, the Supreme Court held that §
1983 and Eighth Amendment principles required the govern-
ment to provide medical care for those whom it incarcerates,
and announced that "deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of prisoners" was the standard for § 1983 claims.76 The
Court ruled that deliberate indifference can be committed ei-
ther by prison doctors or by prison guards.77
In 1991, in Wilson v. Seiter,78 the Supreme Court extended
the deliberate indifference standard to conditions of confine-
ment.79 In so doing, the Court developed a two-part test for de-
71 429 U.S. 97 (1976). See also Friedman, supra note 43, at 929-35 (describing the
history of the deliberate indifference standard and examining the level of health care
to which prisoners are entitled). Friedman believes that the deliberate indifference
standard is not an appropriate standard by which to evaluate prison medical care. See
id. at 946-48. He asserts that the standard places too high a burden of proof of "in-
tent" on the inmate, is difficult to apply, and is outdated since the overall quality of
health care has greatly improved. Id. Friedman proposes a gross negligence standard
instead, arguing that a higher standard of care is necessary. See id. at 948-49.
72 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 98.
7- See id.
7' See id. at 100.
71 See id. at 100-01.
76 See id. at 104.
n See id. at 104-05.
78 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
" See id. at 302-03.
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termining deliberate indifference:80 the prisoner must demon-
strate an objective component -- "sufficiently serious" depriva-
tion-and a subjective component-that the prison official had
a "sufficiently culpable state of mind" that demonstrated delib-
erate indifference to the prisoner's safety.8'
Three years later, in Farmer v. Brennan,2 the Court further
developed Wilson's test, holding that the second part of that test
created a subjective standard of deliberate indifference. 83  The
Court stated that liability of the prison official cannot be estab-
lished unless: (1) "the official knows of and disregards an exces-
sive risk to inmate heath or safety"; (2) "the official [is] aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists"; and (3) "[the official draws] the in-
' See id.
81 See id. In adding the second element, the subjective culpable state of mind re-
quirement, Wilson represented a retreat from previous jurisprudence. In an earlier
case, Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981), the Supreme Court had held that, in
determining cruel and unusual punishment violations, courts should look to objec-
tive standards. See id. at 346; see also DavidJ. Gottlieb, Wilson v. Seiter: Less Than Meets
the Eye, in 1 PRISONERS AND THE LAw 2-35 (Ira P. Robbins ed., 1999) (stating that, in
Rhodes, Justice Powell emphasized that any cruel and unusual punishment test should
rely on objective elements). Professor Gottlieb argues that the addition of a subjec-
tive component incorrectly allocates the responsibility for the cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. See id. at 2-37. The subjective component overlooks the fact that it is often
governmental policy that is responsible for the abhorrent prison conditions, and not
the fault of the individual prison officials. See id. Thus, Wilson's holding creates a
problem in establishing systemic deliberate indifference violations. See id. However,
Gottlieb states that, in institutional cases involving medical care, courts have focused
more on the objective component in Wilson. See id. at 2-41.
82 511 U.S. 825 (1994). SeeJohn Boston et al., Farmer v. Brennan: Defining Deliber-
ate Indifference Under the Eighth Amendment, 14 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 83 (1994) (dis-
cussing the decision in Farmer and arguing that the decision is neither a victory nor a
defeat for prisoners' rights).
The facts of Farmer are as follows: Dee Farmer was incarcerated for credit card
fraud. See id. at 84-85. She was diagnosed as a transsexual, and was housed in various
prisons, sometimes in the general male population. See id. She was segregated on at
least one occasion because of concerns for her safety. See id. In 1989, she was raped
by a fellow prisoner, and filed a suit based on deliberate indifference to her safety.
See id. at 85. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's definition of deliberate
indifference, but held that Farmer's failure to notify prison officials of the danger she
faced was not dispositive of their lack of knowledge. See id. at 96. The Court re-
manded for a determination of whether prison officials knew of the risk to Farmer.
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 848-49.
" SeeFarmer, 511 U.S. at 838-39.
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ference."84 The Court also held that a prison official can be
found to have been aware if the substantial risk is obvious.8s The
Court stated, for example, that a plaintiff could present evi-
dence that the risk of an attack was "'longstanding, pervasive, or
expressly noted by prison officials in the past.'"
In applying the subjective component to determine whether
medical care violates the deliberate indifference standard,
courts focus on the obviousness of the risk. A court needs to
ascertain whether the prison official had a "sufficiently culpable
state of mind"; the court must look at the events as the prison
official may have seen them. Courts should examine whether
the prisoner's medical condition was noted by other prison offi-
cials or doctors.89 Courts should also consider factors such as
"the severity of the medical problem, the potential for harm if
medical care is denied or delayed and whether any such harm
actually resulted from the lack of medical attention."9
In McNally v. Prison Health Services, Inc.,9' for example, the
Federal District Court in Maine denied a prison's motion to
dismiss. The prisoner alleged a § 1983 violation for inadequate
medical care when he was denied HIV medication while a pre-
trial detainee.92 The court stated that "deliberate indifference is
more than negligence. 93 The court also stated that "'when a
supervisory official is placed on actual notice of a prisoner's
8 Id. at 837.
See id. at 842.86 Id. at 843 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 22).
87 See id.
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-03.
'9 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.
9 McNally v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 671, 673 (D. Me. 1998)
(quoting Burns v. HeadJailor of La Salle CountyJail, 576 F. Supp. 618, 620 (N.D. Ill.
1984)).
28 F. Supp. 2d 671 (D. Me. 1998).
92 See id. at 672. The court in McNally stated that, even though the Supreme Court
has not specifically articulated standards for medical care of pretrial detainees, they
"are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted
prisoner." Id. at 673 (citing City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239,
244 (1983)); see also Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir.
1990). See generally Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (addressing rights of pretrial
detainees).
"' McNally, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 673.
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need for... medical care, administrative negligence can rise to
the level of deliberate indifference.', 94 In this instance, where
the prisoner told PHS of his need to take medication immedi-
ately, his doctor confirmed his HIV diagnosis, and the prisoner
was suffering from obvious physical symptoms, the court held
that it could be inferred that PHS was subjectively aware that the
95prisoner required medical care.
There have been many challenges to the adequacy of prison
medical care under the deliberate indifference standard.96 The
plaintiff in a § 1983 claim must show that the injury in question
was inflicted by state actors and that the injury involved a depri-
vation of rights secured by the Constitution and the laws of the
United States.
97
B. LIABILITY OF INSTITUTIONAL DEFENDANTS
Municipalities can be found liable for their official policies
and customs. The liability of a municipality under § 1983 may
not be based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.9 8 Munici-
palities can be held liable only for acts that constitute a govern-
ment custom or policy9 Liability is not limited to official
policies, however, and may be based on the prevailing customs
of the municipality.1°° In Nelson v. Prison Health Services, Inc.,0°
for example, the Federal District Court in Florida stated: "In or-
der to prove the county's liability based on custom, '[the Plain-
tiff] must establish a widespread practice that, although not
authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so
permanent and well-settled as to constitute a custom or usage
with the force of law."",
0 2
"Id. (quoting Elliotv. Cheshire County, 940 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1991)).
See id.
See infra Part III.G (discussing deliberate indifference claims by inmates).
"See, e.g., Nelson v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 991 F. Supp. 1452, 1460 (M.D. Fla.
1997).
See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
9See id.
"o SeeNelson, 991 F. Supp. at 1464.
10' 991 F. Supp. 1452 (M.D. Fla. 1997).




The court in Nelson examined the issue of how to determine
when a "custom or policy" rises to the level of deliberate indif-
ference. °3 The court stated that "a county must be held ac-
countable for more than its officially-codified policies."'0 4 The
plaintiff can base his or her case on customs or policies of the
institution. However, the custom or policy must be "longstand-
ing and widespread" and considered to be "authorized by the
policynaking officials because they must have known about it
but failed to stop it."105 The Nelson court held that the liability
imposed on PHS "mirrors that of the test for the County."'1'
In addition, a plaintiff must prove that the custom or policy
caused the violation of the prisoner's rights. In City of Canton v.
Harris,107 the United States Supreme Court held that there must
be a causal connection between the policy or custom and the
constitutional violation. Similarly, in McDuffie v. Hopper,"8 the
Federal District Court in Alabama stated that a finding of § 1983
liability requires "an affirmative causal connection between the
alleged constitutional violation and an official policy or custom
of the institutional defendant."1°9
'o3 See id. at 1464-65. The Nelson court also addressed the issue of qualified immu-
nity for private health care providers. See id. at 1461. The court cited Richardson v.
McKnight to deny qualified immunity to private companies, and their employees, that
provide health care services to correctional facilities. I&L at 1463 (citing Richardson v.
McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997)). Richardson stated that the decision (denying quali-
fied immunity to prison guards) applies "where a private firm, systematically organ-
ized to assume a major lengthy administrative task... with limited direct supervision
by the government, undertakes that task for profit and potentially in competition
with other firms." Richardson, 521 U.S. at 413. The Nelson court added: "The provi-
sion of medical treatment to an entire institution ... with little or no supervision by
the Sheriff, is clearly the sort of 'major lengthy administrative task' contemplated by
the Court in Richardson." Nelson, 991 F. Supp. at 1462. Thus, there is strong prece-
dent that private health care companies can be held liable under the deliberate indif-
ference standard for systemic violations of prisoner rights by providing inadequate
medical care.
104 Nelson, 991 F. Supp. at 1465 (quoting Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488, 494
(5th Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 640 F.2d 12 (1981)).
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 489 U.S. 378, 388-90 (1989).
'"' 982 F. Supp. 817 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
o9 Id. at 826 n.8.
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In City of Canton, the Supreme Court confronted a civil
rights action in which the respondent claimed that she had re-
ceived inadequate medical attention while in police custody."'
The Court refused to adopt the petitioner's proposed standard
that there could be § 1983 liability only if "the policy in question
is itself unconstitutional." ' The Court held that a municipal-
ity's failure to train its employees can be a policy for which the
city may be held liable if the failure to train causes a constitu-
tional violation.1
2
C. LIABILITY OF PRIVATE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
Using the deliberate indifference standard, courts have ex-
amined the liability of private health care providers who have
contracted to provide services for the government. These pro-
viders can be found liable for a § 1983 violation if, inter alia, the
court finds that state action is present. When a corporation
contracts with a state to provide medical services at a correc-
tional facility, the obligations of the Eighth Amendment attach
to the provider. Thus, the private company becomes a state ac-
tor for purposes of § 1983 liability.
In West v. Atkins,113 the Supreme Court found that there was
state action when a private physician had contracted with a
North Carolina prison to provide medical services to inmates. 4
The Court stated:
We now make explicit what was implicit in our holding in EstelLa Re-
spondent, as a physician employed by North Carolina to provide medical
services to state prison inmates, acted under color of state law for pur-
poses of § 1983 when undertaking his duties in treating petitioner's in-
jury. Such conduct is fairly attributable to the State." 5
Similarly, in Ancata v. Prison Health Services, Inc.," 6 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed
a lower court's dismissal of a § 1983 claim in which the pris-
oner's representatives filed suit claiming inadequate medical
"o See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 381-82.
"' Id. at 386.
"' See id at 388-90.
,, 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
", See id. at 54.
15 Id.
"6 769 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1985).
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treatment after the prisoner had died of leukemia. 17 The court
found that state action was present where PHS provided medi-
cal care to the inmates in the Broward CountyJail."8 The court
stated that, "[a]lthough Prison Health Services and its employ-
ees are not strictly speaking public employees, state action is
clearly present.""9 The court in Ancata also cited several cases to
support the proposition that private health care companies are
state actors.
20
D. MUNICIPAL LIABILFIY BASED ON ACQUIESCENCE IN ACTS OF
PRIVATE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
Municipalities can be found liable for the unconstitutional
acts of contract private health care providers. In Covington v.
Westchester County Jail,2 ' for example, in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York, the plaintiff
alleged that Westchester County manifested a policy of deliber-
ate indifference by entrusting inmates' medical care to EMSA
after being put on notice that EMSA provided constitutionally
inadequate medical care. The plaintiff slipped and fell while
incarcerated in Westchester County Jail. 12  He alleged that he
felt incredible pain and heard something snap in his ankle. 24
17 See id. at 704.
' See id. at 703.
"9 Id. The court went on to say that, "[w] here a function which is traditionally the
exclusive prerogative of the state (or here county) is performed by a private entity,
state action is present." Id.
'20 See id. (citing Lawyer v. Kernodle, 721 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1983); Morrison v.
Washington County, Ala., 700 F.2d 678 (11th Cir. 1983); and Perez v. Sugarman, 499
F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1974)). See generally IRA P. ROBBINS, THE LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF
PRIVATE INCARCERATION 70-119 (1988); Ira P. Robbins, Privatization of Prisons: An
Analysis of the State Action Requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S. C. § 1983,
20 CONN. L. REV. 835 (1988).
"2 No. 96-Civ.-7551, 1998 WL 26190 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1998). In January 1998, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the defen-
dant's motion for a jury trial. See Covington v. Westchester CountyJail, No. 96-Civ.-
7551, 1998 WL 642798, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 1998). In a footnote, the court stated
that "[t]he earliest date that this case will be reached for trial will be February 1999."
Id at *3 n.4.
'22 See Covington, 1998 WL 26190, at *1.
12' See Covington v. Westchester CountyJail, No. 96-Civ.-7551, 1997 WL 580697, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 1997).
124 See id.
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He requested to see a doctor but was denied treatment until
two-and-one-half months later, when he was diagnosed with a
fractured ankle.' The court found that municipal liability need
not be based on any particular action, as long as the municipal-
ity "promoted a policy which sanctioned the type of action
which caused the violations."126 The plaintiff alleged that West-
chester County demonstrated such a policy by allowing EMSA to
provide medical care to inmates even after being put on notice
that EMSA provided deficient care.1 27 To support his theory of
deliberate indifference, the plaintiff introduced evidence that
the county publicly announced its intention to end its contract
with EMSA when a female inmate committed suicide after
EMSA took her off antidepressants without consultation and a
newspaper article recounted several inmates' complaints about
EMSA's care in Westchester County.128 In denying defendant's
motion to dismiss, the court relied on the Eleventh Circuit's de-
cision in Ancata to find that the Westchester County Jail may be
"directly liable for any constitutional violations committed by
EMSA."'9 The court stated that the case should proceed in or-
der to determine if EMSA had violated the deliberate indiffer-
ence standard.8
In addition to Ancata, the Covington court cited Williams v.
Ward 3 ' to support the proposition that municipal liability can be
based on acquiescence in a health care provider's negligence.32
Williams alleged that an unlicensed physician's gross negligence
caused his leg to require amputation. 3 The court denied the
defendant's motion to dismiss where the plaintiff alleged that,
"in hiring... an unlicensed physician and delegating the medi-
cal care of inmates at Attica Correctional Facility to him, defen-
12 See id.
26 Covington, 1998 WL 26190, at *3 (quoting Williams v. Ward, 553 F. Supp. 1024,
1027 (W.D.N.Y. 1983)) (citation omitted).
2 See id. at *1.
128 See id.
SId. at *4.
' See id. at *4-*5.
.. 553 F. Supp. 1024 (W.D.N.Y. 1983).
12 See Covington, 1998 WL 26190, at *4.
"s See Williams, 553 F. Supp. at 1027.
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dant. . . 'evinced a deliberate indifference to the adequacy of
the medical care they would receive.",13
4
E. FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS AS DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
Under the deliberate indifference standard, prison health
care providers may not place financial considerations ahead of
the medical needs of prisoners. Courts have firmly established
that a lack of funds does not justify constitutionally inadequate
treatment of inmates,"5 particularly in the case of medical185
care. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit held that prison health care providers may not place non-
medical considerations ahead of the medical requirements of
prisoners under the deliberate indifference standard. 37 Moreo-
ver, in Ancata, the Eleventh Circuit held that an MCO providing
health care to prisoners would violate the deliberate indiffer-
ence standard by placing financial considerations ahead of in-
mate medical needs.
1 38
1I31 (quoting Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum of Law to Defendant Ward's Motion
to Dismiss or for SummaryJudgment at 14).
"" See Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 201 (8th Cir. 1974)
("Lack of funds is not an acceptable excuse for unconstitutional conditions of incar-
ceration."); see also Ruizv. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1146 (5th Cir. 1982), amended in part
on other grounds, vacated in part on other grounds, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1983); Battle v.
Anderson, 594 F.2d 786, 792 (10th Cir. 1979); Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521,
540 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Welsch v. Likins, 550 F.2d 1122, 1128 (8th Cir. 1977).; Sweet v.
South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854, 869 (4th Cir. 1975); Benjamin v.
Malcolm, 495 F. Supp. 1357, 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Owens-El v. Robinson, 442 F.
Supp. 1368, 1373 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
"3 See Howell v. Burden, 12 F.3d 190, 191 (11th Cir. 1994) (refusing to excuse
prison for failing to administer costly medication to asthmatic because of insufficient
funds); Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68-69 (3d Cir. 1993) (rejecting argument
that budgetary constraints could excuse a failure to adequately treat inmates, despite
a showing that the prison lacked the funds to provide treatment that would prevent
paralysis of inmate); Finney, 505 F.2d at 202 ("[W]e . . . cannot agree that lack of
funds or facilities justify lack of competent medical care."); Morales Felciano v. Ros-
sello Gonzalez, 13 F. Supp. 2d 151, 210 (D.P.R. 1998) ("Budgetary limitations or in-
adequate resources . . . can never be a valid justification for constitutional
violations."); see also Battle, 594 F.2d at 792; Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 331
(M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977).
137 SeeArcher v. Dutcher, 733 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1984).
's SeeAncata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985).
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In the Second Circuit case, Archer v. Dutcher,"9 the court ad-
dressed the situation in which a pregnant female prisoner al-
leged that her constitutional rights had been violated by
inadequate prison medical treatment that resulted in the loss of
her baby.140 The court held that the facts presented were suffi--
cient to constitute a claim that medical treatment had been de-
nied to the prisoner "as punishment for past breaches of the
disciplinary code, or for other invalid reasons." The court
specifically stated that the failure to provide medical care to the
prisoner "in order to make [her] suffer" would undoubtedly sat-
isfy the requirements for a claim under Estelle.14 Thus, Archer
stands for the proposition that a treatment decision based on
non-medical considerations constitutes deliberate indifference.
Similarly, the court in Ancata, citing Archer, held that placing
financial considerations ahead of the medical needs of the pris-
oner can rise to the level of deliberate indifference. 43  The
Eleventh Circuit wrote that, "if necessary medical treatment has
been delayed for non-medical reasons, a case of deliberate in-
difference has been made out.""4 The court held that the plain-
tiffs allegations that the defendants put the financial interests
of PHS ahead of her medical needs were sufficient to state a
constitutional claim.'4
F. INSTITUTIONAL LIABILITY OF PRIVATE HEALTH CARE
PROVIDERS
The foregoing standards provide a basis for private health
care providers who have contracted with the government to be
found liable on an institutional basis for constitutional viola-
dons. Private health care providers can clearly be held liable
under the state action doctrine for constitutional violations of
prisoners under their care. Thus, a managed care organiza-
"9 733 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1984).
1o See id at 15.
.. Id. at 17.
' Id. at 16.
... See Ancata, 769 F.2d at 704.
144 Id
' See id.
146 See supra Part II.C (explaining the liability of private health care providers).
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tion that has contracted with a municipality to provide health
care services to inmates could be found liable for unconstitu-
tional care. The prisoner must allege that a longstanding cus-
tom or policy of the MCO caused a constitutional violation.
Under City of Canton, this policy can be a failure to train its em-
ployees adequately. 4 7 Under Archer and Ancata, placing finan-
cial considerations ahead of the needs of the prisoner can also
amount to deliberate indifference.
4
1
G. CHALLENGES UNDER THE STANDARD
This section summarizes the facts from some of the chal-
lenges to prison medical care under the Eighth Amendment's
deliberate indifference standard. As is evident from these ex-
amples, that standard is most often discussed in rulings on mo-
tions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. If the
plaintiff succeeds on these motions, the medical care company
typically will settle to avoid going to trial.4 9 This practice leaves
a lack of articulated standards on the subject, and a less devel-
oped deliberate indifference standard for purposes of determin-
ing liability of managed health care providers.
Hartman v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc.,15 1 for example, a
federal case from Florida, involved a § 1983 claim of cruel and
unusual punishment arising from the suicide of an inmate,
Mark Douglas." Jeff Schultz, who had primary responsibility
147 See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
14 See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
x For example, in Polk County, Florida, PHS lost on motions to dismiss in two
cases involving allegations of inadequate medical treatment. See Meade v. Prison
Health Servs., Inc., No. 94-854-CIV-T-17-B, 1994 WL 654509, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 10,
1994) (denying motion to dismiss because sufficient evidence existed of deliberate
indifference to suicidal mental state of inmate); Cherry v. Crow, 845 F. Supp. 1520,
1524-25 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (denying motion to dismiss because sufficient evidence ex-
isted of custom or policy of deficient medical care). After its motions to dismiss were
denied, PHS settled these cases. See Rousos, supra note 55, at Al. Moreover, PHS re-
fused to disclose settlement information until required to do so by court order. See
Prison Health Servs., Inc. v. Lakeland Ledger Publ'g Co., 718 So. 2d 204, 205 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1998). It is a general practice of MCOs to refuse to disclose informa-
tion regarding settlement, compensation of doctors, health care spending, and reve-
nues generated by capitated fees. See BIRENBAUM, supra note 35, at 32.
"0 960 F. Supp. 1577 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
... See id. at 1578-79.
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for all aspects of treating inmates with serious mental disorders,
ordered Douglas to be taken off suicide watch.5 Schultz's title
was clinical psychologist, although he was not licensed as such
in Florida.'53 The plaintiff alleged that CMS had policies of al-
lowing unlicensed persons to have full discretionary control
over inmates' mental health and of taking "inmates off suicide
watch as early as possible to avoid use of extra manpower and to
avoid using the contract psychiatrist unless absolutely neces-
sary."54 On these facts, the court, denying summary judgment,
found sufficient evidence that the policies amounted to deliber-
ate indifference: "Schultz was motivated in several respects con-
cerning his.., mishandling of Mr. Douglas' case.... '[W]hen a
private corporation is hired to operate a prison, there is an ob-
vious temptation to skimp on civil rights whenever it would help
to maximize shareholder[s'] profits."' 55
Kelly v. Delaware County Board of Prison Inspectors,55 from
Pennsylvania, arose out of the death of an inmate, Kevin Kelly,
157after significant delay in receiving medication for his seizures.
The plaintiff alleged that PHS had a custom of inadequately
staffing the infirmary, "permitting its on call physician to em-
ploy a covering doctor who was unfamiliar with prison proto-
cols, and delegating treatment decisions to nurses and physician
assistants," thus causing the delay. 58 The court denied the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment, finding sufficient evi-
dence of deliberate indifference to Kelly's serious medical
needs.' 9
In McDuffie v. Hopper,'60 the son of Billy Roberts, a prisoner
who committed suicide while incarcerated in an Alabama state




'MId. (quoting Manis v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 859 F. Supp. 302, 305 (M.D.
Tenn. 1994)).
"6 No. 91-5497, 1996 WL 685433 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 1996).
117 See id. at *1-'2.
&s'Id. at *2.
See id. at *3.
z 982 F. Supp. 817 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
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usual punishment and under various state laws.16 Roberts had a
history of severe psychiatric disorders, had often been put on
suicide watch, and had received large doses of a psychotropic
drug.162 CMS's statewide mental health director allegedly or-
dered Roberts to be placed in an isolation cell rather than a
psychiatric care unit and ordered that his drugs be discontin-
ued. 63 Six days after Roberts stopped receiving medication, he
hanged himselfl'4 The court found sufficient evidence of de-
liberate indifference to Roberts' serious medical needs to deny
CMS's motion for summaryjudgment. 5
In these three cases, the courts found that there was suffi-
cient evidence of deliberate indifference. However, because the
MCOs settled out of court after these rulings, the courts did not
get a chance to decide whether the facts of these cases actually
constituted deliberate indifference. Other cases are currently
pending. On June 23, 1998, a group of prisoners at EastJersey
State Prison brought a class action suit against government enti-
ties responsible for their medical care, and against employees of
CMS, who had been contracted to provide the medical care at
the prison.16
The complaint alleges that the governmental entities and
CMS failed to provide constitutionally adequate medical care. 67
The complaint further alleges deliberate indifference by CMS
because CMS utilized cost-cutting measures that resulted in the
injury and death of several inmates.'6 Specifically, the plaintiffs
allege that CMS withdrew psychotropic drugs from inmates who
needed them, canceled scheduled surgeries, and had inade-
quate staffing at all of the Department of Corrections facili-
161 See id. at 819.
162 See id at 820-21.
16 See id.
16 See id.
' See ia- at 829.
" See Complaint, Jackson v. Fauver (D.N.J. June 23, 1998) (No. 98-2890).
167 See id.
'6 See id. at 11 23-28. The complaint also alleges that GMS misrepresented itself
when it bid for the contract. See id. at 1 20-22. CMS allegedly gave false information
about pending litigation, and stated that they had a "good track record." Id.
[Vol. 90
1999] MANAGED HEALTH CARE JNPRISONS 219
ties. 9 The complaint also describes the unsanitary and over-
crowded conditions of the medical facilities at the prison.
17 1
This case is particularly significant because it alleges that the
cost-cutting measures used by CMS, a managed care organiza-
tion, are deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of
the prisoners.
IV. CAN THE USE OF MANAGED CARE CONSTITUTE "DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE"?
This Article examines whether the use of managed care
alone can constitute deliberate indifference. As discussed pre-
viously, managed health care companies can be found liable for
constitutional violations through state action and institutional
liability.17 ' A municipality that enters into a contract with a pri-
vate corporation for the provision of inmate health care creates
an official policy regarding the health and welfare of those per-
sons for whom it is responsible and should be held liable for in-
juries resulting from that policy. 72  Managed health care
contracts, whether or not in a correctional setting, are generally
entered into as a means of cutting costs.17 Although managed
9 See id. at 11 24-28. The complaint states: "Strangely enough, it appears that
CMS's strategy for cutting costs of medical services is not to provide them." Id. at [
26.
170 See id. at 1 23-33.
173 See supra Parts IIIA-B.
,72 See Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997) ("[C]ontin-
ued adherence to an approach that [officials] know or should know has failed to pre-
vent tortuous conduct by employees may establish ... deliberate indifference."); City
of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989) (finding that municipal liability
should be imposed only if a custom or policy of the municipality is deliberately indif-
ferent and causes the alleged harm).
'73 See Matters Relating to the Federal Bureau of Prisons: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 121-32 (1995) (statement of
Stuart H. Shapiro, M.D., President and CEO, Prison Health Services, Inc.) [hereinaf-
ter Shapiro]. According to Dr. Shapiro, privatizing health care in federal prisons will
save the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) one billion dollars over a five-year period.
See id. at 123. Dr. Shapiro cited statistics indicating that PHS provided correctional
health care to more than 100 facilities in 1993, at an average of $1,987 per inmate
annually, see id. at 127-28, compared to the approximately $3,200 per inmate spent
annually by the BOP in 1994, see id. at 121-23. Other benefits of privatized correc-
tional health care cited by Dr. Shapiro include the predictability of a predetermined
per-inmate fee for health care and a wider variety of on-site health services, thereby
reducing transportation and security costs of off-site services. See id. at 122.
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care has been successful at cutting costs in some cases, 74 critics
worry that the quality of care has often suffered as a result.75
Where the quality of care has diminished under managed care
and resulted in serious injury to an inmate, a municipality
should be held liable for having a custom or policy of putting
financial considerations before the health and safety of in-
mates. 76 Although financial considerations cannot justify in-
174 See id. at 121-22 (discussing lower cost of managed health care); Privatizing In-
mates' Health Care Saves Money But Causes Alarm, Cm. TRIB., Dec. 27, 1996, § 1, at 13
(reporting that New Jersey's privatization of correctional medical care will save at
least $14 million over the first year). But see McDONALD, supra note 7, at 14-16 (stat-
ing that managed health care's ability to cut costs is unproven).
175 See, e.g., Correctional Medical Services Under Fire, CORRECTIONS DIG., Aug. 19, 1999,
at 7 (reporting an increase in the number of complaints-which included pharma-
ceutical errors and substandard care for mentally ill inmates-from 118 to 200 in
Minnesota's correctional care system since CMS took over in 1998); Managed Care
Under Fire in Passaic, N.J., CORRECTIONS DIG., Aug. 12, 1999, at 3 (describing a situa-
tion in Passaic, N.J., in which a county sheriff alleged that privatization of the health
care services in his prison system is endangering the health of 18,000 inmates due to
shortage of nurses, frequent staff turnover, and bureaucracy that makes it difficult to
fill temporary vacancies); Michael Berryhill, Critical Diagnosis: If You Think Your HMO
is Bad, Check Out What Texas Has Created for its Prison Inmates, HOUSTON PRESS, Jan. 22,
1998, at 6 ("When UTMB [, Texas's self created managed care system for correctional
health care,] took over no one had any experience at a prison unit. The approach
was typical of managed care: Cut costs, cut care.") (quoting former Texas prison
health administrator Jim Cook); Joe Jackson, Norfolk Jail Fires Medical Provider; Private
Firm Neglected Sick Inmates, Sheriff Says, NORFOLK VIRGINIAN-PILOT, June 28, 1994, at B1
(reporting that Norfolk City Jail ended their contract with CMS after a number of
inmates died under CMS's care and that jail officials claim that the deaths were due,
primarily, to a lack of patient follow-ups by CMS staff).
In particular, a deficiency in the treatment of HIV and AIDS has come under fire.
See Joe Malinconico, Inmates Say Prisons Skimp on Health Care, Officials Say They Must
Protect the Taxpayers, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, Aug. 10, 1997, at 27 (noting that HIV posi-
tive inmates who receive medical treatment from CMS are generally treated with
medications now considered outdated, such as AZT and the antibiotic Bactrim, rather
that the more recently developed and highly effective protease inhibitors); David Nit-
kin, HIV Care Called Neglectful FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 8, 1998, at 19A
(reporting that inmates at Broward County Jail, where EMSA provides the medical
care, claim that unqualified nurses dispense HIV medications haphazardly without
knowing what they were for or how to pronounce the names of the medicines).
176 See Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985)
(finding that non-medical reasons for delaying necessary medical treatment consti-
tute deliberate indifference); see also Lancaster v. Monroe County, 116 F.3d 1419,
1425 (1lth Cir. 1997) (citing Ancata for the proposition that knowingly failing to pro-
vide needed medical care is firmly established as deliberate indifference); Covington
v. Westchester, No. 96-Civ.-7551, 1998 WL 26190, at *2, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1998)
(citing Ancata and denying county's motion to dismiss where plaintiff alleged that the
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adequate treatment, it is also well established that liability will
not be imposed if it is found that an inmate merely disagrees
with the treatment or medication provided. Several courts have
refused to find deliberate indifference where inmates objected
to the types of medication or treatment prescribed, or to the
dosage provided. The ultimate difference between the two
lines of cases is whether the prescribed treatment could be con-
sidered adequate, even if less costly than other available op-
tions." 8 Deliberate indifference, however, is the state of mind
requirement. The "objectively sufficiently serious" requirement
promises that liability will not be imposed where inmates are
adequately treated.'" The requirement that an alleged injury be
serious and caused by the deliberate indifference of the defen-
county had a custom of denying adequate medical care by allowing EMSA to con-
tinue to provide medical care to inmates after county was on notice that EMSA had
previously provided constitutionally deficient medical care). For other cases discuss-
ing a custom or policy of making medical decisions based on non-medical reasons,
see Moore v. Jackson, 123 F.3d 1082 (8th Cir. 1997) (reversing the grant of CMS's
motion for summary judgment where inmate alleged that CMS had a policy of de-
stroying or ignoring inmates' requests for medical treatment, resulting in a nine-
month delay before his tooth infection was treated); Proffitt v. Prison Health Servs.,
Inc., No. 01A01-9604-CV-00144, 1996 WL 426779 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 1996) (re-
versing lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of PHS where plaintiff al-
leged that delay in receiving surgery was caused by policy of putting profits before
medical needs).
1 See; e.g., Jolly v. Badgett, 144 F.3d 573, 573 (8th Cir. 1998) (upholding lower
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of prison where officials interfered with
inmate's ability to take medication on recommended schedule); Johnson v. Stephan,
6 F.3d 691, 692 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding no deliberate indifference where inmate al-
leged that leg stocking provided for cramping was improper size); Smith v. Marcan-
tonio, 910 F.2d 500, 502 (8th Cir. 1990) (rejecting inmate's deliberate indifference
argument where doctor would not prescribe medications recommended by a differ-
ent doctor); Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1339 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that in-
mate's disagreement with physician over proper treatment for back pain did not
constitute deliberate indifference); Callaway v. Smith County, 991 F. Supp. 801, 809
(E.D. Tex. 1998) (rejecting argument that an inmate receiving an improper dosage
of medicine constitutes deliberate indifference).
178 See Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1575-76 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding
no deliberate indifference and finding adequate medical treatment where jail nurse,
doctor, and psychiatrist provided care and prescribed medications during numerous
visits by Hamm to the infirmary); Pinkney v. Davis, 952 F. Supp. 1561, 1567 (M.D. Ala.
1997) (stating that, although a decision to treat an inmate with a less efficacious
method can constitute deliberate indifference, the issue of whether deliberate indif-
ference is present ultimately turns on whether the treatment was adequate).
'7' See supra Part ILA (discussing the requirement that alleged harm be objectively
serious).
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dant ensures the propriety of deciding the issue of deliberate
indifference without regard to the gravity of the injury alone.280
The use of managed care in the correctional setting creates
a risk that medical decisions will be based on fiscal, rather than
medical, considerations. Case law indicates that, "if necessary
medical treatment [is] delayed for non-medical reasons, a case
of deliberate indifference [is] made out....' Furthermore, sev-
eral courts have specifically rejected the argument that budget-
ary considerations can justify a decision to deny treatment or
provide a less efficacious treatment.8 2 Certain practices used by
MCOs in prisons and jails-such as financial incentives to avoid
treating inmates-inherently ensure that medical decisions will
be based on cost. Other practices of MCOs-such as authoriz-
ing less costly but unqualified staff to treat inmates-create an
unjustifiable risk that cost is the determinative factor in medical
decisions.' Because of the firmly established case law holding
that medical decisions cannot be based on financial considera-
tions,114 financial incentives to delay or deny treatment should
constitute per se deliberate indifference,"" and practices giving
rise to an unjustifiable risk that medical decisions have been
based on financial considerations should warrant a rebuttable
presumption of deliberate indifference. 6
... Cf Barbara Kritchevsky, Making Sense of State of Mind: Determining Responsibility in
Section 1983 Municipal Liability Litigation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 417, 454-59 (1992)
(arguing that the culpability of individual defendants should not determine munici-
pal liability because the presence or absence of a deliberately indifferent custom or
policy is independent of an individual employee's acts in accordance with such a pol-
icy).
'' Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing
Archer v. Dutcher, 733 F.2d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1984)).
182 See supra notes 135-36 (listing cases).
Although the negligent actions of an unqualified or undertrained health care
provider would not be sufficient to meet the culpability requirement of the deliberate
indifference standard, the MCO is deliberately indifferent because it has knowingly
hired that provider. See Kritchevsky, supra note 180, at 454-60 (arguing that the cul-
pability of individual defendants should not determine municipal liability because the
presence or absence of a deliberately indifferent custom or policy is independent of
an individual employee's acts in accordance with such a policy).
'84 See supra Part III.E (discussing the impropriety of basing medical decisions on
non-medical factors, including finances).
180 See infra Part IVA (discussing per se liability).
188 See infra Part IV.B (discussing rebuttable presumption of liability).
[Vol. 90
1999] MANAGED HEALTH CARE IN PRISONS 223
A. PER SE DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
Among the myriad provisions found in contracts between
municipalities and MCOs, financial incentives to avoid treating
inmates have generated the most controversy.187  Contractual
provisions that directly encourage health care providers to deny
medical treatment or provide less efficacious treatment establish
a policy of placing financial considerations above the health and
safety of inmates. When an inmate is seriously harmed because
of a decision to deny adequate treatment in favor of financial
benefits, the policy should be considered per se deliberate indif-
ference to the health of the inmate.
Direct financial incentives to avoid treating inmates, in the
form of bonuses to individual health care providers, jeopardize
the welfare of inmates. Pinellas County, Florida, for example,
entered into a contract with EMSA for prison health care.8
The contract provided a $250 bonus to the medical director, Dr.
David R. Webb, for every emergency 911 call that could be
avoided.' 9 In 1996, inmate Melony Bird died from a heart at-
,'7 See infra notes 188-95 and accompanying text (discussing widespread criticism
of bonuses given to prison doctors). In addition, some courts have recognized the
problematic nature of financial incentives discouraging treatment by requiring MCOs
and health care providers to disclose the existence of such incentives to plan mem-
bers. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the failure
to disclose is a breach of the MCO's fiduciary duty to its enrollees). Several states
have responded to the conflict of interest created by financial incentives by statutorily
requiring disclosure. See AIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-1076 (Supp. 1997); CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 1367.10 (West 1990); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-121 (1997); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 62J.72 (West Supp. 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-23B-5 (Michie 1995);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.13-3 (1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3407.10(C) (4) (a) (Michie
Supp. 1994); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 26-34-109 (Michie Supp. 1996).
'8 See David Nitkin & Mitch Lipka, Inmates Are Lifeblood of Company, Series: Medical
Care inJai FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 8, 1998, at 1A.
,89 See id. Other correctional health care companies have offered similar bonuses.
Dr. Kevin Martin, a former medical director for CMS, claims that he was unofficially
offered a bonus in exchange for reducing the medical procedures he ordered. See
Kim Bell & William Allen, Former CMS Doctor Says Bottom Line Ruled, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Sept. 27, 1998, at G5. According to Dr. Martin, CMS offered him a $30,000
bonus in his new contract if he was able to reduce medical expenditures at his site,
stating, "'You've got this $30,000 hanging over your head if you'd maybe just order a
few less surgeries.' They don't come out and say it but that's what they mean." Id.
The Texas state correctional health care provider (two medical schools in the state
operating under an HMO-type contract) has been attacked for awarding $668,000 in
bonuses to 60 prison docfors in 1997. See Michael Berryhill, Following the Money,
HOUSTON PRESS, Jan. 12, 1998, at *2. The bonuses raise questions about whether the
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tack after Dr. Webb vetoed a 911 call to get her help.'O Al-
though tests revealed the possibility that she was having a heart
attack, thirteen hours elapsed before any help was summoned.'9'
Several weeks after Bird's death, Charles Henderson, another
Pinellas County inmate, was allegedly injured as a result of
EMSA preventing nurses from calling 911.192 Henderson filed
suit against the county, EMSA, and Webb alleging that Webb ve-
toed a nurse's request to get emergency care for Henderson
when he fell into a coma after EMSA staff injected him with flu-
ids containing sugar, despite records indicating he was dia-
betic.'9 Henderson contended that EMSA's failure to summon
help led to disabling nerve and heart damage.' In January
1997, Pinellas County revoked its contract with EMSA and en-
tered into a contract with Correctional Physician Services (CPS),
dropping the bonuses from the new contract.9 5
Bonuses such as the ones provided in the Pinellas County
contract represent a municipal policy of elevating cost-cutting
measures above inmate health. Municipal liability is properly
imposed only if the custom or policy of the municipality causes
the harm. 96 Where, as here, the policy does not facially instruct
employees to injure inmates, liability is proper where the policy
evinces deliberate indifference to inmate health by placing indi-
viduals in a position where it is "all but inevitable" that an injury
will ensue. 97 By providing direct financial incentives to avoid
money was available because of inadequate care and whether any surplus would have
been better spent by returning it to the state. See id.
'0 See Nitkin & Lipka, supra note 188, at 1A.
191 See id.
112 See Jen Pilla, Jail's Health Care Provider Liable for Emergency Costs, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMEs, Feb. 6, 1997, at 3B.
193 See id.
194 See id.
... See id. Despite dropping the bonuses from the new contract, CPS retained most
of the staff previously employed by EMSA and kept a contractual provision identical
to the one found in EMSA's contract that provided for a $25,000 per-incident thresh-
old. See id.
" See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989) (stating that municipal
liability can be imposed where an official custom or policy caused individuals to vio-
late the constitutional rights of the plaintiff).
"' Kritchevsky, supra note 180, at 471; see also Canton, 489 U.S. at 387 (finding that
a municipality can be liable for constitutional injuries where there was a custom of
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treating inmates, a municipality virtually ensures that an inmate
will suffer serious harm, thus demonstrating per se deliberate in-
difference to the health of the inmates.
B. REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTIONS OF DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
Other practices and policies of managed care in prisons
give rise to a rebuttable presumption of deliberate indifference.
A rebuttable presumption is a legal fiction that requires the ex-
istence of a fact (the presumed fact) to be accepted as true
upon proof of other facts (the basic facts).198 Once the basic
facts establish the presumed fact, the party opposing the pre-
sumed fact bears the burden of producing evidence sufficient to
justify finding that the presumed fact does not exist.'9 If the
opponent fails to rebut the presumed fact, it is concluded to ex-
ist.20° If, however, the opponent introduces any evidence con-
tradicting the presumed fact, the prevailing view holds that the
presumption ceases to have any effect and the presumed fact
will be accepted only if the trier believes it to exist. 01
failing to train guards adequately, thus evidencing deliberate indifference to the
safety of inmates).
'8 SeeFLEMINGJAMES,JR. ETAL., CIVILPROCEDURE§ 7.17 (4th ed. 1992); CHARLES T.
MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EViDENCE § 342 (4th ed. 1992); 21 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & KENNETHW. GRAHAM,JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5122 (1978).
' SeeJAMES ET AL., supra note 198, at § 7.17 (explaining the effect of an unrebutted
presumption).
200 See id.
2" The theory that a presumption disappears once the opponent introduces evi-
dence contradicting the presumed fact is attributed to James Thayer and John Wig-
more and is often called the Thayer-Wigmore theory. SeeJAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A
PREumIARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAw 336 (1898); 9 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, WIGMOE ON EVIDENCE § 2490 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 1981). The
Thayer-Wigmore theory is used in the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EVrD.
301 ("[A) presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden
of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to
such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion. . . .") (emphasis
added). In contrast, Morgan and McCormick's theory holds that the presumption
continues to have effect even after the opponent introduces contrary evidence. The
Morgan-McCormick theory states that a presumption should not only shift the bur-
den of producing evidence, but also the burden of proof (or nonpersuasion), such
that a presumed fact will be accepted unless the opponent introduces evidence suffi-
cient to convince the trier of the nonexistence of the presumed fact. See MCCORMICK,
supra note 198, § 342; Edmund M. Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions, 16 S.
CAL. L. REV. 245, 246, 249 (1943); see also The Evidence Project-Proposed Revisions
to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 171 F.R.D. 330, 427-33 (comparing Thayer-
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Courts and legislatures create presumptions "in accordance
with a group of factors sometimes referred to as the Three P's:
Policy, Probability, and Possession of Proof. 20 2 The social policy
furthered by a presumption can justify its creation even absent a
reliable inference leading from the basic facts to the presumed
facts.03 Presumptions, however, generally reflect a logical infer-
ence and thus avoid expending time and energy on proving
what is probable.0 4 In addition, presumptions are frequently
designed to place the onus of producing evidence on the party
2051in the best position to do so.
The use of managed health care in prisons should give rise
to a rebuttable presumption under all three justifications. First,
because inmates are at the mercy of the state's or county's
Wigmore theory with Morgan-McCormick theory and recommending revision of
Federal Rule of Evidence 301 to encompass Morgan-McCormick theory by providing
that a presumption "imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of
proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its exis-
tence").
"2 W~iGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 198, § 5122.
"-'The presumption of the legitimacy of a child born to a married woman cohabi-
tating with her husband is given as an example of a presumption based, at least in
part, on the policy favoring the legitimacy of a child. SeeJAMEs ET AL., supra note 198,
§ 7.17 (giving presumption of legitimacy as example of presumption in which the
presumed "would not even be a permissible inference from" the basic facts); see also
McCoRmvci, supra note 198, § 343 ("[T]he presumption of ownership from posses-
sion... tends to favor the prior possessor and to make for the stability of estates.").
204 See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 198, § 5122 (stating that a decision to create a
presumption requires asking: "'what will be the probable state of facts in most cases?'
so that the burden of showing an idiosyncratic course of events can be placed on the
party asserting the unusual"). The presumption that a properly addressed and
mailed letter reached the addressee is an often given example of a presumption
rooted in a rational inference. SeeJAMES ETAL., supra note 198, § 7.17. Because pre-
sumptions are generally rooted in the probable, they frequently continue to have an
effect on the finder of fact even after the opponent introduces some evidence of the
nonexistence of the presumed fact regardless of whether the Thayer-Wigmore or the
Morgan-McCormick theory is used. See id. ("[A]lIthough countervailing evidence ban-
ishes the artificial procedural effect given by a presumption [of] the [basic facts) ...
it does not destroy the rational probative effect of [the basic facts].").
... For example, because a bailee is in the best position to produce evidence show-
ing what caused harm to property under his or her control, the bailee is often pre-
sumed to be negligent if property is damaged while in the bailee's possession. See
JAMES ETAL., supra note 198, § 7.17 (citing Frissell v.John W. Rogers, Inc., 106 A.2d
162 (Conn. 1954)).
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choice of health care, it should be presumed that MCOs, as
state actors, are executing their constitutional duty. Social pol-
icy dictates that, if an MCO is pursuing a policy of understaffing,
hiring underqualified staff, delaying or denying necessary
treatment, or maintaining any other policy that creates an un-
justifiable risk that financial considerations are being placed
over medical considerations, there should be a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the MCO is acting with deliberate indifference.
Second, a logical inference exists that, when a municipality
decides to save money by contracting with a private company
and an inmate is seriously injured in the face of the cost-cutting
practices of managed care, the injury was caused by the deliber-
ately indifferent policy of placing costs before inmates' health.
In an effort to cut costs, several disturbing practices have
emerged indicating that MCOs are compromising inmates'
health in order to save money: staffing levels have decreased;
underqualified staff are responsible for inmates' health;207 less
expensive, but also less efficacious, treatments are provided;
208
and treatments are frequently delayed or denied.2 0 9 These prac-
tices have developed primarily in prisons in which private com-
panies are responsible for the health care of inmates and are a
direct result of attempts to decrease the costs of inmate health
care. 2'0 Because of the logical connection between cost-cutting
211 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (discussing prisoners' lack of
choice regarding health care).
2" See infra Part 1V.B.2 (discussing staffing problems).
211 See infra Part 1V.B.1.b (discussing inefficacious treatment).
20 See infra Parts IV.B.1.a & c (discussing delayed and denied treatment).
2, See generally Stratton Shartel, Nevada Fight illustrates Need for Careful Evaluation of
Privatized Medical Services, CORRECIIONS ALERT, Feb. 15, 1999, at 2 (warning that mu-
nicipalities should not act hastily in entering into private health care contracts in light
of dramatic increase in the number of inmates alleging inadequate medical care co-
inciding with the rise of privatized correctional health care). These practices are
similar to those employed by MCOs on the outside. See supra Part IIA (discussing
managed care generally).
The case of Jackson v. Fauver, now pending before the United States District Court
for the District of NewJersey, presents the wide range of allegations about managed
care practices made by inmates. See Complaint, Jackson v. Fauver (D.N.J. June 23,
1998) (No. 98-2880). The plaintiffs in Jackson allege that the health care provided to
them by CMS at East Jersey State Prison is constitutionally deficient for a variety of
reasons. See id. A pro se complaint filed by a group of inmates alleges that CMS's
cost-cutting measures have resulted in inmates being taken off needed psychotropic
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measures and inadequate care for inmates, a rebuttable pre-
sumption that an injury was a result of a deliberately indifferent
policy of placing costs before inmates' health is warranted.
Third, the managed health care company is in the best posi-
tion to provide proof on the issue of deliberate indifference.
The company is in possession of information concerning hiring
practices, hiring records, records of treatment, and the policies
of the company. It should not be the burden of the inmate to
prove facts that the company clearly already knows.
A rebuttable presumption of deliberate indifference for cer-
tain aspects of managed care would place the burden of proof
on the managed health care company. When an inmate has
demonstrated serious injury while in the care of an MCO, a re-
buttable presumption should attach where the inmate can show
that the injury was the result of: (1) inadequate or denied
treatment; (2) inadequate staffing; or (3) any other managed
care practice that creates an unjustifiable risk that finances are
being placed over medical considerations.
1. Treatment-Based Controversies
A common feature of inmate health care contracts is per-
incident thresholds capping the financial responsibility of the
MCO.211 Such thresholds provide that the company is responsi-
ble for the costs of an inmate's outside medical care only up to a
certain dollar amount and that the municipality is responsible
for all costs beyond that threshold 2  Because MCOs are always
paid a per-inmate fee for providing medical care, thus being
paid the same whether the inmate remains healthy or becomes
drugs, staffing shortages, canceled and delayed surgical procedures, delayed emer-
gency care, and harassment of inmates who request medical care. See id.
211 See Mitch Lipka, EMSA Criticized in Suit; Ex-Inmate: Staff Ignored Infection, FT.
LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 8, 1998, at 19A (reporting that $50,000 per-incident
threshold at Palm Beach CountyJail discouraged EMSA from sending inmates to the
hospital); Nitkin & Lipka, supra note 187, at IA (discussing EMSA's per-incident
thresholds); Down the Same Path?, LAKELAND LEDGER, Aug. 31, 1996, at A8 (reporting
controversy over per-incident provision in EMSA contract with Pinellas County, Flor-
ida, Sheriff's Office).
"2' See Lipka, supra note 211, at 19A (describing role of thresholds).
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ill,2"' higher thresholds increase the financial responsibility of
the company when an inmate requires medical attention that is
more costly than the contractually provided per-inmate pay-
ment.2 4 As a result, high thresholds have come under attack
because they provide MCOs with a disincentive to treat inmates
adequately.
25
High per-incident thresholds create the risk that MCOs will
restrict inmates' access to costly but necessary medical proce-
dures in order to avoid higher out-of-pocket expenses.1 6 In No-
bles v. Dunci,2 7 for example, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals, in 1998, considered the possible implications of
high per-incident thresholds. Nobles involved a petition for a
writ of mandamus by five inmates at the Huttonsville Correc-
tional Center, at which CMS provided the medical care, chal-
lenging certain conditions at the prison, including the prison's
health care. 28 The Supreme Court of Appeals appointed Judge
Larry Starcher as Special Judge. (Judge Starcher had main-
tained an active role in the operation of Huttonsville from 1985
through 1996.219) Huttonsville's contract with CMS provided a
2,, See Shapiro, supra note 173, at 121 ("[W]e provide services at a predetermined
price and assume all liability.").
214 See Lipka, supra note 211, at 19A (describing role of thresholds).
2,1 See Nobles v. Duncil, 505 S.E.2d 442, 451-53 (W. Va. 1998) (overruling the find-
ing of a Special Judge that high thresholds discourage treatment); Nitkin & Lipka,
supra note 188, at 1A (stating that $50,000 threshold for outside medical care "gives
the company a financial incentive to treat inmates at the jail for illnesses and injuries
that would be traditionally be treated in an emergency room").
216 It is unclear whether preventive treatment of inmates-a standard cost-cutting
practice of MCOs outside of prisons-constitutes medically necessary treatment un-
der the deliberate indifference standard. For example, if an inmate over 50 years of
age with a family history of colon, prostate, or other cancer does not receive preven-
tive screening, a court would likely rule that this lack of treatment does not constitute
deliberate indifference because the inmate has not suffered harm as a result of the
deprivation. However, because males over 50 face a substantial risk of developing
cancer, the argument could be made that the risk to male inmates over 50 is suffi-
ciently obvious to require preventive screening. See What You Need to Know About Can-
cer (visited Jan. 14, 2000) <http://cancemet.nci.nih.gov/wyntk-pubs/index.html>
(National Cancer Institute website providing information about the risk factors asso-
ciated with a variety of cancers).
217 505 S.E.2d 442 (W. Va. 1998).
218 See id. at 446-47.
219 See id.
per-incident threshold of $5,000.220 Judge Starcher's final order
included a provision limiting the per-incident threshold in any
future contracts to $500 because of the risk that the threshold
"might be a fiscal incentive to the contractee [sic] to (1) dis-
courage needed follow-up care from specialists, (2) refuse to
use specialists who insist on quality care for their [patients], ...
[and] (3) delay needed rehabilitative medical care. ' 2 '
The prison officials challenged Judge Starcher's limit on
thresholds, alleging that there was no evidence that the $5,000
threshold created a systematic deficiency in the prison health
care system.222 The Supreme Court of Appeals agreed with the
prison officials that there was insufficient evidence in the record
that the threshold caused medical treatment to be denied.223
Despite the holding, however, the court went on to state that its
decision was based solely on the lack of evidence in the record
and that it was "not passing judgment on the logic or wisdom of
(judge Starcher's] reasoning or belief on this issue. 224
The following sections illustrate how managed health care
has resulted in the denial of necessary treatment, the use of less
expensive but less efficacious treatments, and harmful delays in
treatment.
a. Treatment Denied
Many inmates who receive their medical care from MCOs
allege that they have been denied access to necessary medical
procedures as a result of efforts to lower health care costs. 2s In
220 See id.
2' Id. at 446.
222 See id. at 451-52.
2' See id. at 452-53.
224 Id. at 453.
22 See, e.g., William Allen, Recommended Heart Surgery is Delayed Until It's Too Late, ST.
Louis POST-DiSPATCH, Sept. 27, 1998, at 8 (reporting on the death of Roy Hilton at
the New Mexico Penitentiary after CMS failed to schedule clearly needed heart sur-
gery, which CMS claims was not performed because Hilton refused surgery until he
could obtain medical clemency); Herbert Lass, Massachusetts Inmates Use Legal Force to
Get lN Hepatitis C Therapy, BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, Aug. 17, 1992, at 3 (discuss-
ing Hepatitis C sufferers' suit against Massachusetts Department of Corrections, alleg-
ing that they received no treatment since EMSA began its contract to provide health
care to the inmates).
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Broward County, Florida, for example, Walter Roszowski, an
inmate under the care of EMSA physicians, was refused surgery
to remove a tube that had been inserted to help him pass kid-
ney stones. 26 Approximately seven stones were lodged between
the tube and his ureter, leading to a painful infection and blood
in his urine.227 Roszowski stated that medical staff informed him
that his surgery was denied because it was considered elective
and would be too costly.28  Robert Washington, another
Broward County inmate, was denied surgery on his hernia.2
According to Washington, two doctors warned him that without
surgery his life was in danger because of the risk of the hernia
bursting.! ° Attorneys for EMSA stated that Washington did not
receive surgery because he already had the hernia when he was




Another disturbing trend among correctional health care
companies is the use of inexpensive over-the-counter medica-
tions to treat serious illnesses.32 The use of inferior medications
to treat serious disorders has raised questions about the quality
233
of health care in jails and prisons. An attorney with the Vol-
2 See Nitkin & Lipka, supra note 188.
27 See id.
2 See id.
20 See Noreen Marcus, Prisoners Fight with an Outside Hand; Pro Bono Lawyers Handle
Civil Rights Law Suits, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 29, 1998, at 1B (reporting




212 See, e.g., Laura Lafay, Prison Deaths Put Focus on Health Contractor; Company Oper-
ates Medical Facilities in 184 Prisons and Jails in 27 States, NORFOLKVIRGRNIAN-PILOT, May
9, 1996, at A12 (mentioning inmate died of lung cancer after CMS treated his com-
plaints of chest pain with ibuprofen); Nitkin & Lipka, supra note 188 (revealing that
an inmate diagnosed with borderline emphysema was given an inhaler and sent back
to his cell by an EMSA nurse after complaining of chest pains; he was found dead a
few hours later).
'See Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985) ("Al-
though the plaintiff has been provided with aspirin, this may not constitute adequate
medical care. If deliberate indifference caused an easier and less efficacious treat-
ment to be provided, the defendants have violated the plaintiffs Eighth Amendment
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unteer Lawyers Project (VLP) stated that, over the three years
he has been with VLP, medical cases have surpassed excessive
force cases as the most prevalent inmate complaint: "[T] hey are
far more serious than we've ever seen before.... For excruciat-
ing pain, at best, they get ibuprofen when they should be seeing
specialists."2 In a Georgia prison at which CMS provides the
health care, an inmate complaining of chest pain was given ibu-
profen after a cursory medical examination.2  A month later
the inmate died of lung cancer.236
c. Treatment Delayed
Inmates have also alleged that prison officials delay adminis-
tering approved treatments in order to save money.3 7 Proffitt v.
Prison Health Services, Inc.28 involved an inmate's allegation that
prison officials delayed a needed surgery because of a policy of
putting profits before inmates' medical needs.29 When Proffitt
became incarcerated, she had a broken leg and transfixing
rights ....") (quoting West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 162 (3d Cir. 1978) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
" Marcus, supra note 229 (quoting attorney David Weintraub).
23 See Lafay, supra note 232 (reporting on controversy surrounding CMS, includ-
ing inmates' deaths and Norfolk City's cancellation of health care contract after mul-
tiple deaths).
23 See id.
07 Nelson v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 991 F. Supp. 1452 (M.D. Fla. 1997), involved
the death of Diane Nelson, from acute myocardial infarction, at Pinellas County Jail.
When Nelson arrived at the jail, her initial medical exam indicated she was taking
medications for a heart condition. See id. at 1457. She began asking for her medica-
tions and complaining of pain the morning after her arrival, but never received them
during the three days of her detention prior to her death. See id. at 1458-59. In an
affidavit, a PHS nurse "admitted to having joked that '[we] save money because we
skip the ambulances and bring them right to the morgue."' Id. at 1458 (quoting
Jackson Deposition at 63). The court found sufficient evidence to deny PHS's mo-
tion for summaryjudgment. See id. at 1467-68.
Richard Kleinhans, a former CMS nurse, reports that CMS went to great lengths
to increase profits, including delaying treatments until an inmate was released or
transferred. See Kim Bell, Inmate Got Cancer Treatment After a judge and a Nurse Stepped
In, ST. Louis PosT-DISPATCH, Sept. 27, 1998, at 5. For example, Kleinhans stated: "[I]f
somebody needed oxygen, and they were in for a misdemeanor, the jail would call
the judge up and say, 'Can we get his bond lowered?"' Id. In addition, pregnant in-
mates nearing their delivery would be released only to be re-arrested once the child
was born. See id.
No. O1AO1-9604-CV-00144, 1996 WL 426779 (Tenn. Ct. App.July 31, 1996).
"9 See id. at *3.
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screws in her knee.240 Her initial medical exam revealed that the
screws needed to be removed and surgery was approved.2 4 ' De-
spite approving the surgery, however, PHS never scheduled the
surgery and the screws remained in Proffitt's knee until after
she was paroled six months later.2  PHS asserted that the delay
was due to the relatively low priority level of the surgery, but
presented no evidence of higher priority cases that actually ren-
dered them unable to schedule the surgery.4 Based on this
evidence and the affidavit of an internal medicine expert that
the surgery was clearly necessary and must have been delayed
for non-medical reasons, 244 the Tennessee Court of Appeals re-
versed the lower court decision granting summary judgment in
favor of PHS .
In addition to delaying treatments until the inmate is re-
leased, MCOs have been accused of transferring inmates to
other facilities and prematurely releasing inmates in order to
avoid paying for necessary medical procedures. Between 1995
and 1997, despite its own policy dictating that medical proce-
dures are to be performed before transferring inmates, EMSA
reportedly transferred forty-three inmates to other facilities
246
where different companies handled the inmates' health care.
Among the transfers, at least two jeopardized the inmates'
health, some occurred on the same day that treatment was
214 See id. at * 1.
241 See id.
212 See id. Proffitt was recommended for parole to the Samaritan Recovery Center
three months prior to her actual parole, but was denied release to the Center because
her leg remained untreated. See id.
21 See id. at *5 ("Uncontradicted evidence that needs of higher priority actually did
render defendant unable to supply the services sooner might suffice, but such specific
and definitive evidence was not offered.").
244 See id. at *4 (citing affidavit of Charles A. Rosenberg, M.D., an internal medical
specialist and consultant in the field of correctional medical care).
2"5 See id. at *7.
246 See Nitkin & Lipka, supra note 188 (discussing EMSA's transfer of inmates de-
spite their own policy dictating that medical procedures are to be performed before
transfers take place).
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In an effort to lower costs, MCOs often compromise the
quality of inmate care by reducing staffing levels and employing
unqualified medical personnel . Courts have already found
that understaffing in state-run prison health care facilities con-
stitutes deliberate indifference.24 9  Complaints by prisoners
against MCOs are numerous and some have brought suit alleg-
ing that inadequate staffing caused constitutional injuries2so In
247 See id. (citing an unidentified authority); see also Bell, supra note 237 (discussing
allegations that CMS employed a similar delay tactic to avoid paying for costly medical
care).
24 See generally BIRENBAUM, supra note 35, at 142 (stating that short-staffing by
MCOs in order to cut costs has created a demand for "safe staffing" legislation); see,
e.g., TEXAS AuDrr, supra note 35, at 93 ("The substitution of lower qualified staff is a
common trend in managed care settings today among providers in the private sector
as well as correctional health care corporations."); Christy Hoppe, State Audit of Prison
Health Care Questions Profits, Quality But Service Called Improving as Costs Drop, DAULAS
MORNING NEWS, Jan. 17, 1998, at 17A (stating that an audit of UTMB revealed that
eight doctors had previously been disciplined by medical review boards and that
UTMB failed to check employees' references, graduation records, or residency pro-
gram completions); Jackson, supra note 175 (citing a report commissioned by the
Norfolk City Jail that found CMS hired unqualified nurses to manage the majority of
inmate health care); Lafay, supra note 232 (reporting that a Department of'Justice in-
vestigation of CMS criticized the MCO for failing to train their staff appropriately).
2149 SeeAnderson v. City of Atlanta, 778 F.2d 678, 686 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that
short-staffing may constitute deliberate indifference); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559,
578 (10th Cir. 1980) ("[B]ecause of staff shortages inmates are effectively denied ac-
cess to diagnosis and treatment by qualified health care professionals. Such condi-
tions endanger their health and well being, make unnecessary suffering inevitable,
and evince on the part of the state a deliberate indifference to the serious health
needs of the prison population.").
"5 See Chuffo v. Ramsey, 55 F. Supp. 2d 860, 864-67 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (holding, inter
alia, that the claim that CMS's failure to train nurses adequately led to the death of an
inmate survived a motion for summary judgment); Kelly v. Delaware County Bd. of
Prison Inspectors, No. 91-5497, 1996 WL 685433, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 1996) (de-
nying PHS's motion for summary judgment where plaintiff alleged that inmate's
death was caused by PHS's policies of inadequately staffing the infirmary, permitting
doctors to employ covering doctors who had not worked in prisons before, and dele-
gating treatment decisions to nurses and physician assistants); Hartman v. Correc-
tional Med. Servs., 960 F. Supp. 1557, 1578-79 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (addressing inmate's
allegations that CMS had a policy of employing unlicenced psychologists).
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Hartman v. Correctional Medical Services,25' for example, an inmate
with psychological problems, being treated by an unlicensed
psychologist, committed suicide after being taken off suicide
watch. 2 The plaintiff in Hartman alleged that CMS's policies of
allowing unqualified persons to treat mental patients and of
prematurely taking patients off suicide watch in order to avoid
using extra manpower caused the inmate's death.s
The introduction of the market rationale to prison health
care in the form of managed care has created distinct patterns
of cost-cutting practices that are deliberately indifferent to the
medical needs of inmates. Municipal liability is properly im-
posed if an official custom or policy is deliberately indifferent to
inmates' health. 4 The use of MCOs, with their emphasis on
cutting costs, has created a well-documented risk that medical
decisions are being based on financial considerations that result
in constitutionally inadequate treatment.s 5 The prevalence of
problems associated with privatized correctional care is suffi-
cient to put jail and prison officials on notice of the risk that
managed care practices will result in constitutionally deficient
medical care. Thus, when an inmate under the care of an MCO
is seriously harmed and can demonstrate that this harm was the
result of inadequate treatment or staffing, or any other man-
aged care practice that creates an unjustifiable risk that finan-
cial concerns are being given priority over medical
considerations, a rebuttable presumption that a policy or cus-
tom of deliberate indifference exists is warranted. 6 Courts
" 960 F. Supp. 1557 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
2 See id. at 1578. Jeff Shultz, clinical psychologist, was responsible for the inmate's
mental health care, despite not being licensed in Florida. See id.
53 See id. at 1579. The court denied CMS's motion for summaryjudgment, finding
a genuine issue of fact as to whether CMS's policies regarding inmates' mental health
constituted deliberate indifference. See id. at 1582-83.
2" See supra Parts III.B & D (discussing requirements of municipal liability).
2" See supra Part IV.B (detailing widespread reports of the inadequacies of man-
aged health care in prisons).
16 See Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997) (finding that,
in a limited number of circumstances, municipal liability is proper where prison offi-
cials fail to alleviate an obvious risk of serious harm); Covington v. Westchester, No.
96-Civ.-7551, 1998 WL 26190, at *2, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1998) (allowing plaintiff-
inmate to proceed to discovery where plaintiff alleged that the county was deliber-
ately indifferent in allowing EMSA to continue to provide medical care to inmates af-
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must guard against systematic violations of inmates' Eighth
Amendment rights by carefully scrutinizing managed care prac-
tices in prisons.
V. CONCLUSION
In an effort to cut costs, many state and county incarcera-
tion facilities have turned to private managed health care or-
ganizations to provide health care for their prisoners.
Despite-or, perhaps, because of-the money saved by the gov-
ernment and the money made by managed care organizations,
the level of health care in these facilities has decreased, and
prisoner complaints and lawsuits are on the rise. Private man-
aged health care in prisons has resulted in inmate injuries and
deaths, many of which have been and are being challenged on
Eighth Amendment grounds.
Constitutional violations in prison health care are deter-
mined under the deliberate indifference standard. The Su-
preme Court has held that government entities, or private
companies carrying out governmental duties, can be held liable
for systemic deliberate indifference violations where the entity
promulgates an official custom or policy that violates prisoners'
constitutional rights. Without question, some managed health
care systems in prisons contain aspects that constitute an official
custom or policy that violates prisoners' constitutional rights.
Some aspects of managed care, particularly direct financial
incentives to avoid treating inmates, constitute per se deliberate
indifference. Courts should find that the implementation of
these policies always fails constitutional muster. Other aspects
of managed care create a rebuttable presumption that deliber-
ate indifference exists. Measures to save money-such as cut-
ting staff, hiring less qualified staff, and denying, delaying or
providing inefficacious treatment-can give rise to a rebuttable
presumption that deliberate indifference has occurred.
Legislatures should consider banning private managed
health care in prisons and jails. In the alternative, legislatures
might consider enacting and departments of corrections might
ter county was on notice that EMSA provided substandard care that resulted in the
death of an inmate).
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consider contracting for provisions that ensure the adequate
treatment of inmates. Absent these alternatives, the use of
managed health care in incarceration facilities, and the de-
creased level of care that comes along with it, should remain
under the constant vigilance of federal and state courts, whose
obligation it is to enforce the Constitution of the United States.
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